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— Note —
Providing a Release Valve:
The U.S.-China Experience with
the WTO Dispute Settlement
System
Abstract
Ever-expanding global trade relations have spawned highly
contentious disputes between the United States and the People’s
Republic of China, two of the world’s most powerful economic
juggernauts. These trade frictions have sparked an increased
utilization of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) dispute
settlement system. Has the WTO become a forum for proxy trade
battles to play out between the United States and China? Or does the
increase in trade disputes portend a more serious deterioration of
economic relations that could devolve into an outright trade war?
This Note addresses this trend toward resorting to WTO dispute
settlement through the lens of the legal, cultural, and social aspects of
the Sino-American trade relationship. The discussion demonstrates
that both the United States and China exhibit a willingness to comply
with WTO rulings for myriad reasons. These reasons are presented
using a framework that analyzes the impact of the institutional
structure of the WTO’s dispute settlement system and the indirect
benefits accrued through participation. While the WTO dispute
settlement system provides both countries with a mechanism for
resolving contentious trade issues, this Note attempts to advance a
practical discourse about responsible management of WTO litigation.
The United States and China have much to gain from the usage of
the WTO’s dispute settlement system to resolve trade frictions and
would do well to maintain such an advantageous system.
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Introduction
The sounds of saber rattling seem to emanate from the delicate
relationship between the United States and China. Observers1 and
media2 alike have proclaimed the possibility of a trade war looming on
the horizon. While trade frictions between Washington and Beijing
occur in nearly every facet of the relationship,3 the latest trends in
World Trade Organization (WTO) litigation have garnered intense
scrutiny. In recent years, both countries have initiated an increasingly
higher volume of cases against one other. While many view this trend
as a harbinger of a potential trade war, this Note will present an
alternative interpretation of this trend in U.S.-Chinese WTO
litigation. The litigation-intensive focus between the United States
and China within the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
evidences the efficacy of the institution and the willingness of both
countries to utilize the DSB as a viable trade-friction intermediary.
1.

See, e.g., Protectionism Risks Provoking Global Trade War, 63 INT’L
BAR NEWS 51 (2009) [hereinafter Protectionism Provoking Trade War].

2.

See, e.g., Richard Blackden, Trade War Fears After Obama Attack on
China, TELEGRAPH, Sept. 18, 2012, at B1; Kathy Chu, Possible Trade
Dispute Looms, USA TODAY, Jan. 9, 2012, at 5B.

3.

See Robert D. Hormats, Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy,
and the Environment, Remarks at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center: The
Future of U.S.-China Economic Relations (Dec. 6, 2012) (transcript
available
at
http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/2012/201631.htm)
(discussing the various trade frictions that exist between the United
States and China).
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Part I analyzes the role of international dispute settlement in
general, specifically those systems predicated on a rule orientation.
This Part then introduces the process and operation of the DSB, the
unique historical context of China’s accession to the WTO, and the
early interactions between the United States and the People’s
Republic in the DSB. Part I provides the necessary framework within
which to analyze the relational developments between the two parties
in the DSB as a rule-oriented international dispute settlement system.
Part II addresses the argument that U.S. and Chinese decisions to
resort to increased WTO litigation foreshadow the onset of a trade
war. The components of the DSB that make it both a suitable forum
for resolving contentious U.S.-Sino disputes are presented in Part III.
These components will be analyzed through the characteristics that
induce both China and the United States to utilize the DSB as a legal
forum. Parts III.A and III.B introduce the direct institutional benefits
and indirect benefits, respectively, that members are able to accrue.
The accuracy of this Note’s contention is demonstrated in Part III.C,
which analyzes two DSB cases between the United States and China:
U.S.—Poultry4 and China—Intellectual Property Rights.5 These cases
illustrate the willingness of both countries to submit important issues
to the DSB. Furthermore, Part III.C discusses the importance of
compliance by the losing parties and the implications of compliance as
acceptance of the DSB’s legitimacy. Part III.D addresses the
alternative mechanisms for resolving trade disputes that ultimately
can be less appealing than engaging the DSB. Part IV identifies
several limitations on this Note’s contention as to the long-term
ability of the DSB to mitigate U.S.-Sino trade frictions.
Finally, this Note presents some concluding suggestions about the
future of the DSB as a viable mechanism for addressing burgeoning
trade frictions between Beijing and Washington. This Part further
reiterates the necessity of altering the discourse on U.S.-China WTO
litigation from one of trade-war implications to one geared toward the
responsible management of the DSB as a trade-friction intermediary,
providing a beneficial legal forum for venting frustrations.

4.

Panel Report, United States—Certain Measures Affecting Imports of
Poultry from China, WT/DS392/R (Sept. 29, 2010) [hereinafter
U.S.—Poultry].

5.

Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26,
2009) [hereinafter China—Intellectual Property Rights].
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I.
A.

Context and Historical Perspective

Rule-Oriented Dispute Settlement in the International System

While a discussion of the entirety of the vast body of international
dispute settlement is beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to
examine certain aspects pertaining to the operation of the WTO’s dispute
settlement mechanism in order to understand the broader role of the DSB
within the international system. International dispute settlement takes
myriad forms including negotiations,6 good offices, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration,7 judicial settlement by permanent courts, and
resort to regional agencies or arrangements.8 Unlike domestic courts,
international dispute settlement uniquely involves the interaction of
states as the frequent actors. International dispute settlement
mechanisms are structured upon various theoretical foundations—
including power-oriented structures and rule-oriented structures—under
which the members interact.9 A power-oriented structure is reliant on an
“explicit or implicit reference to [a state’s] relative power and ‘bargaining
chips.’”10 International dispute settlement based on power-orientation is
characterized by “unilateral retortions [sic] and reprisals,” which run the
risk of provoking retaliatory countermeasures.11 Such a structure differs
immensely when juxtaposed with a rule-oriented system that is
predicated on the “enforcement of rules that were previously agreed by
both parties.”12 Within a rule-oriented structure, dispute settlement
operates as the mechanism for enforcing the previously agreed upon rules
between the various states.13 Although the power-oriented structure of
international dispute settlement provides for an interesting discourse, this
Note will focus on the proliferation of rule orientation as a viable
international dispute settlement mechanism, specifically with regard to
the WTO’s dispute settlement system.

6.

Negotiation between parties to the dispute is the basis of the
consultations stage of the WTO dispute settlement system. Under this
framework, the parties are obligated to engage in consultation request
and provide “sympathetic consideration” to the other member’s
concerns. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes art. 4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S.
401 [hereinafter DSU]. For a discussion of the value of negotiation as a
beneficial, and perhaps more desirable, dispute settlement mechanism
within the WTO, see Amelia Porges, Settling WTO Disputes: What Do
Litigation Models Tell Us?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 141 (2003).

7.

For a discussion of the role of arbitration within the DSB, see Yasuhei
Taniguchi, The WTO Dispute Settlement as Seen by a Proceduralist,
42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 10-12 (2009).

8.

Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International Economic
Law—Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in
Non-Economic Areas, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 189, 195 (1999) [hereinafter
Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law]. The
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A rule-oriented structure provides all members of the system with a
plethora of benefits that induce acceptance and a willingness to resort to
dispute settlement in order to preserve expected benefits from the rules.
For one, the existence of a viable dispute settlement system bolsters the
value of the commitments made within an international agreement
Dispute Settlement Understanding contains a number of the available
forms of international dispute settlement to be utilized at various stages
of the dispute process. The DSU provides at various instances for
“bilateral and multilateral consultations (Article 4), good offices
(Articles 5, 24), conciliation (Articles 5, 24), mediation (Articles 5,
24), . . . and international arbitration (Article 25).” Id. at 209. The DSU
further provides a legalized dispute settlement mechanism that operates
as a quasi-judicial structure involving panel and appellate review
procedures. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution:
Proliferation, Fragmentation, and Decentralization of Dispute
Settlement in International Trade, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 273, 302,
309 (2006) [hereinafter Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution].
Although the DSB contains a variety of dispute settlement mechanisms,
this Note focuses on the quasi-judicial structure encapsulated in panel
and Appellate Body determinations.
9.

See J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 235–36
(4th ed. 2005) (discussing the switch from the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system of dispute settlement to the WTO
dispute settlement as being termed a switch from a “power-oriented”
approach to a “rule-oriented” approach); Petersmann, Dispute
Settlement in International Economic Law, supra note 8, at 193–95
(citing JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 109 (2d ed. 1997)).

10.

Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law, supra note
8, at 194. Petersmann discusses the United Nations’ dispute settlement
system as a prime example of a power-oriented structure. Id. at 190–91.

11.

Id. at 194.

12.

Id. The WTO system was founded as a rule-based organization wherein
all members agreed upon accession to be bound by all covered
agreements and the compulsory jurisdiction of the DSB. As such, the
theoretical foundation of the DSB’s dispute settlement system is
centered on a rule-based orientation.

13.

Id. Petersmann’s hypothesis concerning the efficacy of a rule-oriented
structure relies on three factors: (1) the applicable substantive rules;
(2) the availability of a legal dispute settlement system that induces
both usage of the system and compliance with outcomes; and (3) the
legal limitation of a member’s ability to resort to alternative dispute
resolution methods. Id. at 197–98. Applying these factors to the DSB, it
is clear that the WTO structure exhibits strong attributes of all three
factors. First, the substantive rules related to the DSB are the covered
agreements that compose the foundation of the WTO. Second, the panel
determinations and appellate review induce members to utilize the DSB
and to comply with adverse rulings. See discussion infra Part III.A.
Finally, the DSU contains provisions requiring members to utilize the
DSB as recourse for WTO disputes. DSU, supra note 6, art. 23.
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through an assurance of the agreement’s enforcement.14 Credible
commitments in turn promote stability and consistency within the
international order, particularly within the international economic
system.15 In addition, the basis for the system provides states with an
incentive, and in some systems a requirement,16 to utilize the dispute
settlement system rather than resort to potentially more deleterious
alternative dispute settlement measures.17 With pre-determined rules
instead of power politics as the foundation of the system, states are
provided an opportunity to raise disputes from a position of equality.18 As
such, rule-oriented international dispute settlement mitigates the power
dynamics that can often damage international relations between states
and the associated international organizations. The rule-based structure
“helps to prevent the detrimental effects of unresolved international trade
conflicts and to mitigate the imbalances between stronger and weaker
players by having their disputes settled on the basis of rules rather than
having power determine the outcome.”19 Furthermore, dispute settlement
within the context of a comprehensive international organization provides
a forum in which members can effectively negotiate and resolve
discrepancies. The forum benefits the parties through a reduction in both
transaction costs and asymmetric information.20 Finally, under ruleoriented structures, dispute settlement mechanisms can provide the
14.

WTO & INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 128 (Sun Fa Bai et al. eds.,
2008).

15.

See, e.g., Michael P. Ryan, Knowledge, Legitimacy, Efficiency and the
Institutionalization of Dispute Settlement Procedures at the World
Trade Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization,
22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 389, 394 (2002) (“Markets demand credible,
enforceable commitments to function properly.”).

16.

Within the WTO system, member states are obligated under the DSU
to utilize the dispute settlement system for resolving disputes involving
the covered agreements. DSU, supra note 6, art. 23.

17.

See XUESEN ZHANG & GARY D. PATTERSON, LEGAL RULES OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 361 (English ed. 2008) (“The objective of
these rules and procedures [is] to avoid unilateral actions that could
destabilize[ ] and disrupt international trade, which could lead to
inconsistency among nations in terms of trade policy and cause
uncertainty in private transactions regarding international trade.”).

18.

See, e.g., Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution, supra note 8, at
359 (“The rule-oriented WTO dispute settlement system clearly
mitigates power disparities in international relations and helps
governments limit power politics inside their countries (e.g., by limiting
protectionist abuses of trade policy discretion in favor of rent-seeking
interest groups by requiring independent judicial remedies inside
countries like China that did not have such legal institutions prior to
WTO membership).”).

19.

WTO & INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 14, at 128.

20.

Ryan, supra note 15, at 395.

206

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 1·2013
Providing a Release Valve
benefit of clarifying the rules and obligations enumerated under the
various covered agreements.21 Clarification of the rules through dispute
settlement offers a consistency and clarity throughout the international
order by removing ambiguities and uncertainties pertaining to the agreed
rights and obligations.
B.

Role of the Dispute Settlement Body

The DSB stands as one of the achievements of the Uruguay
Round of Negotiations in 1995 that resulted in the creation of the
World Trade Organization.22 The DSB was designed to remedy a
number of the weaknesses23 and failures of its predecessor, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) dispute settlement
system.24 The efficacy of the GATT dispute settlement system was
21.

See Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution, supra note 8, at 359
(noting the growing influence of such clarifications over multilateral
WTO negotiations); Wei Zhuang, An Empirical Study of China's
Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: 2001–2010, 4
LAW & DEV. REV. 217, 218 (2011) (describing participation in the DSB
as “essential for shaping the interpretation and application of WTO law
over time”). Although the DSB is not predicated on a formalized
common law approach, “Appellate Body and panel reliance on and
citation of past WTO jurisprudence suggest WTO law’s common law
orientation.” Id.

22.

MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 211-12, 233; see also Chi Manjiao, China’s
Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement over the Past Decade:
Experiences and Impacts, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 29, 29 (2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (calling the DSB the “the jewel of the crown
of the World Trade Organization”); Matthew Kennedy, China’s Role in
WTO Dispute Settlement, 11 WORLD TRADE REV. 555, 555 (2012)
(discussing the importance of the DSB as a “major contributor to the
WTO’s success”).

23 . For an example of the differences between the GATT and WTO
treatment of the same trade remedy measure see generally Mostafa
Beshkar, Trade Skirmishes Safeguards: A Theory of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Process, 82 J. INT’L ECON. 35 (2010) (discussing the evolution
of members’ utilization of the safeguard mechanism between GATT
Article XIX and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards).
24.

MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 214; see also Leah Granger, Explaining the
Broad-Based Support for WTO Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
521, 524 (2006) (“The failures of the GATT dispute settlement system
set the stage for countries to later support the WTO’s stronger rulebased system.”); Donald McRae, Measuring the Effectiveness of the
WTO Dispute Settlement System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 1, 4 (2008) (“Dispute settlement under the WTO is compulsory,
cannot be blocked, has a defined timeline and a more fully articulated
process, and includes an appellate process, making it different in many
important respects from the old GATT process.”). But see generally
Kim Van der Borght, Justice for All in the Dispute Settlement System
of the World Trade Organization?, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 787
(2011) (highlighting the shortcomings of the DSB with regard to
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frustrated by the consensus requirement for decision making. This
allowed nations whose measures were challenged to constructively
block the establishment of a panel or the implementation of an
adverse ruling.25 The flaws inherent in the GATT system prompted
the desire for change when forming the WTO. Positive change was
accomplished through an adherence to binding panel and Appellate
Body determinations whose adoption requirement was changed to
reverse consensus.26 This transformation in decision-making
requirements greatly diminished the role of politics within
international trade dispute settlement in favor of a rule-oriented, legal
forum. At the center of the WTO’s newly created dispute settlement
system is the Dispute Settlement Body, entrusted with the responsibility
of resolving trade disputes under the WTO covered agreements.27
As an organ of the WTO, the DSB is designed to “provid[e]
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system” and to
“preserve the rights and obligations of Members.”28 The WTO
implements a formalized dispute settlement structure to enforce and
promote these enumerated goals.29 Unlike the previous GATT regime,
developing countries); Sean P. Feeney, The Dispute Settlement
Understanding of the WTO Agreement: An Inadequate Mechanism for
the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL.
L.J. 99, 114 (2002) (examining “major problems” that still exist in the
DSU); see also Ryan, supra note 15, at 404 (“[A] growing number of
scholars and other observers opine that decision-making at the
organization is undemocratic and call into question the legitimacy of the
WTO laws which underlie dispute settlement decisions.”).
25.

MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 214 (“An obvious weakness of the panel
procedure was that since both setting up a panel and the adoption of its
report required consensus in the GATT Council, it was possible for a
state whose actions were challenged to block effective action.”); John D.
Greenwald & Lynn Fischer Fox, The WTO’s Emphasis on Adjudicated
Dispute Settlement May Be More Drag Than Lift, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 133, 133–34 (2007) (noting that panel decisions under the
GATT system did not have the “force of a binding legal decision”).

26.

DSU, supra note 6, art. 16.4 (establishing that the panel report will be
accepted unless the ruling is appealed or “the DSB decides by consensus
not to adopt the report”); see also MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 214
(noting that the changes made with the WTO system “effectively
remove[d] the political check on panel procedures”).

27.

See MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 234 (noting the importance of the DSB
as being “political[ly] responsib[le] for integrating the dispute settlement
system and ensuring its effectiveness”).

28.

DSU, supra note 6, art. 3.2.

29.

See JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20088, DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: AN OVERVIEW 3–5
(2006) (providing an overview of the steps involved in a dispute before
the DSB). See generally Marian Ladner & Ogbo Ossai, Dispute
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the WTO dispute settlement system is compulsory for all WTO
members.30 This commitment conveys the willingness of all members
to bind themselves in advance to the adjudicatory powers of the
DSB.31 The system is designed to compel losing respondents to bring
any offending measure(s) into conformity with WTO obligations
rather than to render punitive damages.32 One innovative feature of
the DSB is the Appellate Body, which allows the losing party to
appeal an adverse judgment from the panel determination.33 Other
features include the framework of process deadlines and compliancemonitoring mechanisms that generate an “integrated dispute
settlement” whereby the same rules apply to all disputes leveled
under the covered agreements, unless specifically provided for under
an agreement.34 The DSB’s adjudicatory process is an essential
element of the WTO system, maintaining and promoting the
organization’s goal of “develop[ing] an integrated, more viable and
durable multilateral trading system.”35 In doing so, the DSB occupies
a unique legal position within the international community as its
utilization provides a novel legalized structure with which to protect
the concessions and expected benefits of all members.
C.

China’s Accession to the WTO

The process of negotiating China’s membership in the WTO was
long and arduous.36 In negotiating its accession, China made a number
Settlement in the World Trade Organization, 20 INT’L L. PRACTICUM
15–16 (2007) (discussing the process for dispute settlement: consultation,
panel, appeal, and implementation).
30.

See Manjiao, supra note 22, at 29 (noting the “binding force” of DSB
decisions due to the threat of sanctions); see also Zhuang, supra note 21,
at 218 (citing the DSB’s “exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction on
matters arising under WTO agreements” as a source of its “unique
power as an international dispute settlement body”). Additionally, for a
discussion of the GATT mechanism for initiating and resolving disputes,
see MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 213–14.

31.

See MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 234 (“Though styled an ‘understanding’,
the DSU is an integral part of the WTO Agreement and according to
Article 2(2) legally binding.”).

32.

Ladner & Ossai, supra note 29, at 17. For additional discussion of the
lack of punitive damages in the DSB’s remedies, see infra note 77 and
accompanying text.

33.

Granger, supra note 24, at 523; see also infra notes 79–85 and
accompanying text.

34.

GRIMMETT, supra note 29, at 2.

35.

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 155 (1994).

36.

Many observers recognize the difficulties of China’s path to WTO
membership but submit that, despite these issues, China’s ultimate
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of unique concessions on issues of trade in both goods and services
that far exceeded the obligations of other WTO members.37 Despite
the myriad unique obligations in China’s Accession Protocol, China
still viewed WTO membership as a vital component of its long-term

accession to the organization is beneficial for every member of the
WTO. See, e.g., Wenhua Ji & Cui Huang, China’s Experience in
Dealing with WTO Dispute Settlement: A Chinese Perspective, 45 J.
WORLD TRADE 1, 1 (2011) (alteration in original) (noting that although
the Chinese accession to the WTO was the result of fifteen years of
“tough negotiations,” China’s membership is “an important step
towards making the WTO a truly world organization”). But see, e.g.,
Xiaohui Wu, No Longer Outside, Not Yet Equal: Rethinking China’s
Membership in the World Trade Organization, 10 CHINESE J. INT’L L.
227, 232, 269 (2011) (emphasis added) (viewing China’s accession process
as the result of “protracted and tortuous negotiations” in which “China
was pressed to accept exceptionally [unfavorable], non-reciprocal and
asymmetric terms of membership” that warrant a reexamination of
China’s membership status in the WTO). China’s accession also sparked
mixed sentiments about the impact of China on the WTO and the DSB,
in particular. See generally Peter K. Yu et al., China and the WTO:
Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2003), for a
panel discussion that “reflect[s]” on China’s accession to the WTO and
“explore[s] its ramifications.”
37.

Two primary burdensome concessions revolve around Articles 15 and 16
of the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China.
Article 15 allows other WTO members to utilize nonmarket-economy
methodologies when conducting antidumping investigations under
certain conditions for goods originating in China. World Trade Org.,
Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, pt. 1, § 15,
at 8-9, WT/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001) [hereinafter China Accession
Protocol], available at www.wto.org. Article 16 creates a unique
transitional safeguard mechanism only applicable to Chinese goods. Id.
pt. 1, § 16, at 9–10; see also Manjiao, supra note 22, at 35 (noting the
wide range of WTO-plus obligations China accepted including
“commitments concerning transparency, judicial review, uniform
administration, national treatment, foreign investment, market
economy, and transitional review”); Henry Gao, Elephant in the Room:
Challenges of Integrating China into the WTO System, 6 ASIAN J. WTO
& INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 137, 147-51 (2011) (“The Mismatch between
the China-specific Provisions and the Normal WTO Framework”);
Chad P. Bown, U.S.–China Trade Conflicts and the Future of the
WTO, 33 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 27, 33 (2009) (“As a price of
China’s accession, the membership demanded that Beijing take on many
more policy commitments than had traditionally been required of other
acceding countries . . . .”); Julia Ya Qin, “WTO-Plus” Obligations and
Their Implications for the World Trade Organization Legal System,
37 J. WORLD TRADE 483 (2003) (discussing the unique concessions
contained within China’s Accession Protocol, as well as the Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of China, and the potential long-term
impact of incorporating WTO-plus obligations in accession protocols).

210

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 1·2013
Providing a Release Valve

economic prosperity.38 China even accepted the mandatory
jurisdiction of the DSB—a monumental step in Beijing’s affirmation
of the role of the international system.39 China joined the “club of
rule-abiding countries”40 as it was instituting extensive measures to
bring its economy into conformity with accession obligations.41
Throughout China’s negotiations, the United States consistently
advocated for China’s membership in the WTO.42 The United States
had a particular interest in bringing China into a rule-oriented,
formalized system that allowed for compulsory adjudication of trade
frictions and violations of economic commitments.43 Despite the
difficult accession negotiations, both China and the United States
recognized the long-term benefits of WTO membership for the
People’s Republic.44
D.

U.S.-China Interaction Within the Dispute Settlement Body

In order to fully appreciate the recent trends in WTO litigation
between Beijing and Washington, it is necessary to examine the
dynamic between the two powers during the first five years of China’s
WTO membership (2001–06). The initial years were relatively calm in
terms of litigation as China became acclimated to the new system.45
Scholars and observers have posited numerous explanations for
38.

See Pasha L. Hsieh, China’s Development of International Economic
Law and WTO Legal Capacity Building, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 997, 998
(2010) (arguing that China’s dynamic economic growth over the last
several decades would not have been possible if not for its accession to
the WTO).

39.

See Pasha L. Hsieh, China-United States Trade Negotiations and
Disputes: The WTO and Beyond, 4 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 369, 391 (2009) (“The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the
first and only state-to-state ‘international court’ under which China has
consented to mandatory jurisdiction.”); Zhuang, supra note 21, at 218
(“[T]he WTO DSB is the only international ‘court’ of compulsory
jurisdiction that China has recognized without reservation, and remains
the only international judicial body to which China has resorted.”).

40.

SUSAN SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER 132 (2007).

41.

See, e.g., KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION
THROUGH REFORM 322 (2004) (arguing that China’s transformation of
domestic measures is “accelerating [China’s] integration into the
international economy”).

42.

SHIRK, supra note 40, at 25 (going as far as to call the United States the
“chief sponsor” of China’s accession).

43.

Hsieh, supra note 39, at 375.

44.

See infra notes 111–19 and accompanying text.

45.

See Ji & Huang, supra note 36, at 2 (calling the early phase when
other trading partners did not engage China in DSB litigation a
“honeymoon period”).
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China’s reticence to utilize the DSB including its “non-litigious legal
traditions,”46 a lack of internal legal capacity,47 and limitations
imposed within China’s accession protocol.48 In fact, China did not
have to defend itself as a respondent until three years after its
accession in 200449 and defended against only one other complaint in
the first five years.50 During this period, China brought only one case
against the United States.51 Some believed that the rhetoric
emanating from Beijing in 2005 indicated that China would not
actively utilize the DSB to resolve trade frictions.52 Beijing’s official
stance began to change in 2006 when it proclaimed that China would
utilize the WTO and the DSB to properly handle trade frictions.53
A juxtaposition of the inactivity during the initial five-year period
with interactions since 2006 demonstrates the trend toward an
increasing utilization of DSB litigation by both China and the United
States.54 For example, the United States brought thirteen WTO cases

46.

Zhuang, supra note 21, at 231 (discussing China’s traditional preference
to settle dispute through noncontentious means so as not to cause any
party a public “loss of face”).

47.

Xiaojun Li, Understanding China’s Behavioral Change in the WTO
Dispute Settlement System: Power, Capacity, and Normative
Constraints in Trade Adjudication, 52 ASIAN SURVEY 1111, 1125 (2012);
Zhuang, supra note 21, at 231.

48.

Chad P. Bown, China’s WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and
Dispute Settlement, in CHINA’S GROWING ROLE IN WORLD TRADE 281,
328 (Robert C. Feenstra & Shang-Jin Wei eds., 2010) (citing China’s
continued designation as a “Non-Market Economy” under China’s
accession protocol as a contributing factor).

49.

Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Value-Added
Tax on Integrated Circuits, WT/DS309/1 (Mar. 18, 2004).

50.

Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting
Automobile Parts, WT/DS340/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2008).

51.

Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures
on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS251/AB/R (Nov. 10,
2003) [hereinafter U.S.—Steel Safeguards].

52.

See, e.g., Li, supra note 47, at 1132–33 (analyzing comments from Bo
Xilai, then Beijing’s Minister of Commerce, and the cryptic rhetoric
contained within the China’s State Council’s white paper China’s
Peaceful Development Road).

53.

Id. at 1133 (citing Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council,
Report of the Work of the Government, (Mar. 5, 2006) available
at http://web.archive.org/web/20081014232653/http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/china/2006-03/15/content_538753.htm (providing the full-text
version of the Premier’s report that was delivered at the Fourth Session
of the Tenth National People's Congress)).

54.

See Ji & Huang, supra note 36, at 2 (“After this honeymoon period was
over, . . . China’s major trade partners intensified their WTO legal
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against China between 2007 and 2012—three in 2007, two in 2008,
one in 2009, three in 2010, one in 2011, and three in 2012.55 The
United States went from initiating two cases over five years against
China to thirteen cases over six years.56 Similarly, China has initiated
a higher volume of cases against the United States since 2006—one in
2007, one in 2008, two in 2009,57 one in 2011, and two in 2012.58
China’s altered reliance on the DSB to resolve trade frictions with the
United States is evident considering that China utilized the dispute
settlement system once in the first five years and seven times in the
subsequent six years. The statistical variations in litigation reliance
within the WTO intimate a marked shift in both countries’ strategies
for resolving trade frictions.59 In fact, litigation between Beijing and
Washington accounts for a significant portion of both countries’
overall DSB interactions. Both parties’ drastic changes in the usage of
the DSB continue to garner significant discourse on the trend’s
motivations and implications, particularly whether these changes
symbolize a positive or negative development for the international
trading system.

II. Does Increased Litigation Portend the Onset of a
Trade War?
As Beijing and Washington alter their attitude toward the DSB,
many interpret the aggressive litigation focus as a harbinger of a trade
war between the two economic juggernauts. Some believe such an
challenges against China, and, in response, China took on a higher
offensive profile . . . .”).
55.

Chronological List of Disputes Cases, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm
(last visited Aug. 13, 2013). As of August 13, 2013, China has not filed
any new cases against the United States in 2013. Id.

56.

Id.

57.

China’s increased activity within the entire WTO in 2009 led many to
term the year the “WTO’s China year.” Li, supra note 47, at 1112
(quoting Li Chenggang, the Deputy Director of the Ministry of
Commerce’s Department of Treaty and Law, at the annual conference of
the Shanghai Consulting Center for the WTO in December 2009); see
also Manjiao, supra note 22, at 32 (“Year 2009 is deemed as ‘the year of
China for the WTO dispute settlement’ since 7 out of the 14 cases filed
in that year involved China.”).

58.

Chronological List of Disputes Cases, supra note 55. As of August 13,
2013, the United States has not filed any new cases against China in
2013. Id.

59.

Matthew Kennedy, formerly a senior lawyer in the WTO Secretariat,
referred to China’s drastic shift in its utilization of the DSB as “the
most significant change in the identity of the [DSB’s] top participants
since the establishment of the WTO.” Kennedy, supra note 22, at 559.
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event is imminent under current conditions. The rise in dumping
charges, the political unwillingness to compromise, and the
“proliferation of trade conflicts and protectionist measures” are cited
as evidence of an escalating movement toward a full-blown trade
war.60 Other observers point to “tit-for-tat” WTO complaint filings as
evidence of the deterioration of U.S.-Sino relations.61 The increased
litigation discussed in Part I.C is seen as a negative development that
could have dangerous effects if not diminished.62 Others temper this
sentiment by pointing to specific failures on either side that could
cause the relationship to devolve into a trade war. Chad P. Bown,
Senior Economist for the World Bank’s Trade and International
Integration Development Research Group, discusses that the inherent
nature of litigation is volatile.63 Bown questions the ability of China
and the United States to utilize the DSB in a positive manner that
mitigates frictions.64 While not decrying a trade war as inevitable,
Bown does say that “we are in for some U.S–China fireworks
emanating from Geneva.”65 While trade frictions do exist and at times
can get extremely heated, this Note advances a different
interpretation of the increased litigation: a sentiment that views the
trend as a positive development with the two economic juggernauts
willing to resolve disputes through a rule-based, formal system. As the
interaction between Beijing and Washington becomes more regular
within the DSB, the possibility substantially diminishes for either to

60.

Protectionism Provoking Trade War, supra note 1, at 51–52.

61.

See, e.g., Offensive Maneuvers, CHINA ECON. REV., Dec. 2012, at 6–7;
see also Chu, supra note 2 (discussing concerns that an imposition of
U.S. tariffs on Chinese solar-cell makers could lead to the reemergence of
the “tit-for-tat trade spat that gained traction in 2009 when President
Obama slapped steep duties on Chinese tires” and manifest itself in an
“all-out trade war”).

62.

See Kara Loridas, Note, United States-China Trade War: Signs of
Protectionism in a Globalized Economy?, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 403, 413 (2011) (emphasis added) (“As a result of the onslaught of
WTO litigation between the United States and China, their relationship
was characterized by the media as war-like, a characterization that
speaks more to the political ramifications of the disputed trade barriers
than to their economic magnitude.”); see also Chu, supra note 2
(discussing the implications of “tit-for-tat” tariff impositions as
escalating trade frictions).

63.

See Bown, supra note 37, at 31 (“In these WTO disputes, what starts as
seemingly harmless legal maneuvering and argumentation often turns
into political battles, threats, and legally-sanctioned implementation of
actual retaliation, and media-fed worries of an all-out trade war.”).

64.

Id.

65.

Id. at 32.
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make such a catastrophic “misstep”66 that would cause the
relationship to devolve into a trade war.

III. Characteristics Making the Dispute Settlement
Body Appealing
A.

Dispute Settlement Body’s Institutional Impact

The DSB provides a number of direct benefits through its
organizational structure and rule-based system.67 Membership in the
WTO assumes that nations will fulfill trade-related commitments and
realize expected benefits.68 The WTO deals broadly with the rules of
trade between nations, encompassing a host of responsibilities both
globally and intergovernmentally.69 The DSB stands as the forum
through which WTO rules and obligations are protected.70 Serving as
a crucial component to the WTO’s operation, the DSB attempts to
promote stability within the international trading system.71 When a
member abrogates its WTO obligation, the DSB provides a dispute
settlement process for aggrieved parties to seek remedy.72
First, the remedies available within the DSB structure provide a
direct benefit to both the complainant and respondent. For the
complainant, a favorable outcome from a panel ruling results in a
judgment ordering the removal of the respondent’s disputed

66.

Id. at 31.

67.

The function, role, and rules of the WTO’s dispute settlement system
are encapsulated in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. The
Dispute Settlement Body is established within this Understanding “to
administer [the Understanding’s] rules and procedures and . . . the
consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered
agreements.” DSU, supra note 6, art. 2.1.

68.

Every member of the WTO expects to receive the benefits of the WTO
system’s primary tenets: (1) the Most Favored Nation Principle; (2) the
National Treatment Principle; (3) reciprocal tariff concessions; and (4) a
prohibition on quantitative restrictions. General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade arts. I, II, III, and XI, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.

69.

The WTO identifies the numerous dimensions it covers as an
international trade organization including liberalizing trade, serving as a
forum for nations to negotiate trade agreements, resolving trade
disputes, and operating a system of trade rules. What is the World
Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english
/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).

70.

See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.

71.

See supra note 28 and accompanying text.

72.

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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measure.73 Retaliation, as a permissible remedy, is allowed only as a
“last resort” and is subject to a number of institutional limitations
when a member fails to bring the measure into conformity with the
DSB decision.74 The complainant’s retaliatory measures are only
“temporary” and can consist of a suspension of concessions at a level
“equivalent” to the harm.75 Given the various remedy measures, the
complainant is provided some way to mitigate the harmful effects of
the offending member’s measure.
Even when faced with an unfavorable verdict, the respondent is
able to directly benefit from the structured remedy system within the
DSB. The limitations surrounding retaliation ensure that the
respondent is confronted by temporary measures that the DSB
determines are equivalent to the respondent’s offending measure.76
This remedy application mitigates the prospect of punitive damages
that are meant to punish offending nations beyond the actual harm
incurred.77 These limitations also prevent escalation of a “tit-for-tat”
trade war. Even when a complainant is permitted to retaliate, such
actions are narrowly tailored to minimize the disturbance in
liberalizing trade.78
These benefits provided by the DSB incentivize member nations,
such as the United States and China, to utilize the formal forum
rather than to engage in potentially volatile bilateral negotiations,79
especially considering the lack of limitations on national action
outside a formal international organization. This instills a confidence
within both countries that a loss in the DSB will not result in
73.

See DSU, supra note 6, art. 3.7 (“[T]he first objective of the dispute
settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the
measures concerned if [the measures] are found to be inconsistent with
the provisions of any of the covered agreements.”).

74.

Id.

75.

Id. arts. 22.1, 22.4.

76.

Id.

77.

See McRae, supra note 24, at 8 (clarifying that “WTO compensation
and retaliation are sanctions” not in the sense of punishing members as
in criminal law but rather in the sense of inducing compliance as may be
found in contract or tort law); see also Granger, supra note 24, at 523
(citing ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS? RETALIATION
UNDER THE WTO (2003); DAVID PALMETER, THE WTO AS A LEGAL
SYSTEM: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND POLICY 346 (2003))
(“The DSU limits the form and scope of retaliations because the goal of
dispute settlement is to support and maintain the integrity of the
trading regime.”).

78.

See Bown, supra note 37, at 35 (comparing the WTO retaliation
structure to “surgical retaliation” and pronouncing a “political
difference” between WTO retaliation and “blunt force retaliation”).

79.

See discussion infra Part III.D.
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exorbitant penalties that ultimately dwarf the initial harms.80 The
guarantee of proportionality allows both the United States and China
to conduct a cost-benefit analysis concerning the maintenance of a
measure, particularly when the removal of a WTO inconsistent
measure is not politically feasible at the time of the panel
determination.81 Furthermore, both the United States and China can
feel assured that taking sensitive topics to the DSB will not result in
the imposition of additional obligations other than those agreed to
and enumerated in the covered WTO agreements.82 This ensures that
no outcome from the DSB can burden either country with obligations
that have not been fully negotiated and from which they could not
opt out. These measures operate as safeguards that build faith in the
efficacy of the WTO as an international organization entrusted with a
mandatory dispute settlement system.
Second, the advent of the appellate process within the
international trading system allows for review of panel decisions,
providing a higher level of scrutiny and consistency.83 The Appellate
Body is designed to provide legitimacy to the economic dispute
settlement system through a focus on the composition, scope of
review, and structured deadlines. For composition, the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides specific qualifications for
persons serving on the Appellate Body in order to bolster the validity
and legitimacy of appellate review determinations.84 The scope of the
appellate review does not include fact finding, which is the role
specifically delegated to the panel.85 Instead, the design of the DSB
80.

The DSU provides further safeguard mechanisms to ensure that retaliatory
authorization is not abused through a resort to binding arbitration if the
offending party objects to the level of concession suspension. DSU, supra
note 6, arts. 22.6-22.7; MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 230.

81.

DSU, supra note 6, art. 21.3 (granting the offending member a
“reasonable period of time” to bring the measure into conformity if
immediate compliance is “impracticable”).

82.

Id. art. 3.2 (“Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered
agreements.”).

83.

Ryan, supra note 15, at 403.

84.

For one, the DSB appoints persons to serve on the Appellate Body for a
four-year term, with the possibility of being reappointed for one more
term. DSU, supra note 6, art. 17.2. For another, the persons selected are
those of “recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law,
international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements
generally.” Id. art. 17.3. The DSU further prohibits a person’s
participation in any dispute that “would create a direct or indirect
conflict of interest.” Id.

85.

YANG GUOHUA ET AL., WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING:
A DETAILED INTERPRETATION 205 (2005).
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appellate process reduces appealable issues to those of law that are
“covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by
the panel.”86 Furthermore, the deadlines enumerated within the DSU
for appellate decisions provide participants with a clearly defined
timetable for the resolution of disputes.87
The Appellate Body quickly demonstrated its efficacy as it
resolved a number of high-profile, controversial cases that had been
holdovers from the previous GATT era.88 The establishment and
success of the appellate review within the WTO system provides
China and the United States assurance that DSB litigation is not
subject to a single panel determination, allowing either nation to
target specific issues of law or legal interpretations thought to be
incorrectly determined under the covered agreements. This feature
instills confidence that the ultimate outcome of a contentious trade
dispute between the United States and China will be properly
adjudicated.89
Third, the myriad issues presented in each case allow the DSB to
render determinations that are “win-win” rather than merely a
“winner-take-all” system.90 The DSB can achieve a mutually beneficial
process through the application of independent review for resolving
disputes.91 Impartiality, as a hallmark of the DSB, allows panelists to
divorce trade issues from the typical state-centric political rhetoric.
The ability to separate and resolve multiple issues through a tradeforum intermediary provides the United States and China benefits in
dealing with trade frictions. The political connections that complicate
complex trade issues can be disassociated from the appropriate
adjudication under the WTO covered agreements.92
86.

DSU, supra note 6, art. 17.6.

87.

Id. art. 17.5; see also id. art. 20 (“time-frame for DSB decisions”).

88.

For a discussion of the six controversial holdover cases and how the
Appellate Body’s resolution of these cases cemented its dominant role in
the DSB, see William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System:
The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 21–23 (2005).

89.

See Stuart S. Malawer, United States-China WTO Litigation (2001–
2010), 59 VA. LAW. 28, 47 (2010) (“When litigation is resolved properly
it establishes a strong basis to move forward in trade relations and
negotiations.”).

90.

See Bown, supra note 37, at 31 (noting that the resolution of trade
disputes between China and the United States can produce mutually
beneficial economic outcomes through “market access gains to U.S.
exporters and reforms that enhance China’s economic growth”).

91.

See MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 317 (describing the impartial nature of
international judges).

92.

See id. (identifying the potential for WTO litigation to “diffuse
political tensions”).
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This positive development in the resolution of complex trade
issues is evident in the contentious dispute between Beijing and
Washington over intellectual property protections within China.93 The
United States brought three claims against China under the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): the
threshold for criminal procedures and penalties, the disposal of
infringing goods, and the copyright protection for censored works.94
While the Panel ruled favorably for the United States on the issues of
the disposal of infringing goods and the copyright protection for
censored works, the United States lost on the important issue of the
threshold for criminal procedures and penalties.95 The panel’s mixed
ruling allowed both sides to claim a successful outcome in the case.96
The DSB was able to independently assess the complex, but related,
claims and adjudicate each claim on its legal merit under the TRIPS
agreement. Had these issues been subject to bilateral negotiations, the
resolution of the trade friction may have been impossible due to
political intermingling of all the issues into one “winner-take-all”
scenario. This mentality may very well have escalated the trade
frictions between Beijing and Washington into a full-blown trade war.
The institutional characteristics of the DSB encourage the United
States and China to utilize the dispute settlement forum to resolve
contentious trade issues.97 As the WTO remedies a number of the
inherent flaws that plagued the GATT system, members gain a
greater confidence in the adjudicatory powers of the trade dispute

93.

China—Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 5, ¶ 1.1.

94.

Peter K. Yu, The U.S.-China WTO Cases Explained, MANAGING
INTELL. PROP., Oct. 1, 2009, available at http://www.peteryu.com/mana
gingip_362.pdf.

95.

Id.; see also Hsieh, supra note 39, at 388 (“[E]ven though the panel
found in favor of the U.S. on most issues, the U.S. did not prevail on its
Article 61 claim, which was presumably the most important claim from
the perspective of U.S. businesses.”).

96.

See, e.g., Yu, supra note 94 (“As the Acting US Trade Representative,
maintained: ‘These findings are an important victory, because they
confirm the importance of IPR protection and enforcement, and clarify
key enforcement provisions of the TRIPs Agreement.’ The response by a
spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, by contrast, was
more subdued. Although he welcomed the report’s findings on criminal
thresholds, he ‘expressed ‘regret’ about the [unfavorable] aspects of the
ruling.’”).

97.

Some argue that while both countries continue to permit the DSB to
adjudicate politically sensitive issues, neither is willing to litigate
perhaps the most contentious issue between the two powers, the
valuation of the Chinese currency. See Malawer, supra note 89, at 30, 32
(calling the currency issue the “elephant in the room,” but ultimately
concluding that it is not within the scope of the WTO disciplines).
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settlement system.98 The features of the rule-based organization that
have augmented its efficacy and the members’ willingness to utilize
the DSB include its neutrality99 and legitimacy.100 The DSB provides
members with a rule-oriented dispute settlement system with which
to address trade frictions. The DSB provides tangible benefits through
its remedy-limiting mechanisms, its appellate process, and its ability
to adjudicate mutually beneficial situations. These benefits induce
both the United States and China to continuously employ the DSB to
mitigate trade frictions.
B.

Indirect Benefits that Induce Usage of the Dispute Settlement Body

While the direct benefits from the DSB’s institutional
characteristics help to explain the rationale underlying the United
States’ and China’s decisions to join and use the WTO and its dispute
settlement system, the indirect benefits accrued by both nations may
illuminate why both powers have drastically increased their utilization
of the litigation feature. One indirect benefit of advancing national
ends through WTO litigation is the mollification of domestic anxiety
in both the People’s Republic and the United States. Another benefit
is the channeling of an individual nation’s behavior so as to produce a
more cooperative international trading environment. The continuous
usage of the DSB as a forum for trade dispute settlement instills a
long-term investment for both nations in the longevity and ultimate
viability of the organization.101 Additionally, the litigation focus
through the DSB allows both Beijing and Washington to project “soft
power” throughout the international system. Finally, experience with
DSB litigation bolsters China’s internal legal capacity, which can
generate positive benefits for both China and the international
system.

98.

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.

99.

See MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 219 (identifying the dispute settlement
panel’s requirement to objectively assess the facts and the law pursuant
to DSU Article 11); see also Ten Years in the WTO: Has China Kept
Its Promises?: Hearing Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China,
112th Cong. 45 (2011) [hereinafter Hearing Before the Cong.-Exec.
Comm’n on China] (statement of Claire E. Reade, Assistant U.S. Trade
Rep. for China Affairs) available at http://www.cecc.gov/events/hearings
/ten-years-in-the-wto-has-china-kept-its-promises (“China’s WTO
membership offers an important tool for managing the increasingly
complex U.S.[-]China trade relationship. A common WTO ‘rule book’
and an impartial body in Geneva have helped [the United States and
China] resolve differences when dialogue fail.”).

100. See infra notes 119–20, 194 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 22, at 576 (“China has become vested in
the maintenance of the norms of the system.”).
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The Sino-American relationship remains a salient political issue
within the United States, with the People’s Republic often vilified. A
number of subjects tend to ignite the ire of the American public and
Congress, including human rights, currency manipulation, and trade
frictions. The U.S. administration’s engagement of China through
DSB litigation conveys a strong political stance in instances of
perceived violations of China’s international obligations. This
litigation strategy toward China helps to placate the American
public’s anger as well as the calls for tougher legislation from
Congress.102 The saber rattling from Congress can prove potentially
catastrophic for U.S.-Chinese relations as protectionist trade
legislation can spark damaging retaliatory policies from China.103 The
U.S. administration can use WTO litigation to address issues
preemptively before protectionist elements in Congress can act.104 For
the American government, WTO litigation provides a unique ability
to diffuse political tensions that could have deleterious ramifications
for the long-term benefit of the Sino-American relationship.105
While the Chinese government is not subject to the same
democratic undulations, domestic pressure within China is of great
concern to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) political stability.
Economic concerns are always at the forefront of the CCP’s domestic
and foreign policy, as demonstrated through the maintenance of the
currency policy that has caused much contention. Sometimes, China’s
initiation of WTO litigation is the direct result of domestic concerns
toward particularly prominent trading partners.106 Like the United
States, the Chinese government can utilize DSB determinations to
implement or speed up reforms that may not be particularly popular
domestically.107 This is particularly true in situations in China where

102. See Malawer, supra note 89, at 30 (“The United States actively and
aggressively uses the litigation process as a means for confronting China
on a range of trade restrictions . . . . This clearly gives Congress and the
American public the appearance of being tough on China . . . .”).
103. See Bown, supra note 37, at 42–43 (examining the possible harms of
Congressional protectionist measures on U.S.-Sino trade relations).
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., id. at 34 (emphasizing the importance that the U.S. Trade
Representative and Beijing appropriately use WTO litigation to “diffuse
political pressures within the United States”).
106. See Malawer, supra note 89, at 30 (“China actively and aggressively
uses the litigation process for both domestic and foreign policy
purposes . . . [and] brings actions as a means of responding to domestic
pressures.”).
107. See id. at 30, 32 (“It allows the Beijing government to rationalize
unpopular actions that need to be taken domestically in order to comply
with WTO disciplines.”); see also Bown, supra note 37, at 38 (noting
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reform, without DSB determinations, would be untenable. The
prospect of WTO litigation and the permeation of DSB norms
throughout China can provide the CCP domestic credibility for
instituting reformist policies.108 Increasing WTO litigation and
improving Chinese legal savvy can also provide the indirect benefit of
bolstering the Chinese public’s faith in not only the WTO and DSB
but also other international organizations.109 This provides the CCP
with a stronger trade dispute mechanism that would have more
support from the Chinese domestic populace.
A dedication to resolving trade disputes through the DSB
provides the governments in Beijing and Washington both clout and
political protection.110 Given the complex political landscape, using the
DSB allows both the United States and China to vent domestic
frustrations through an international legal forum. The use of the DSB
as a third-party intermediary allows both governments to deflect
losses while still resolving tense political frictions. The DSB allows the
United States and the People’s Republic to diffuse political tensions
that can arise within a domestic market, especially with the public,
media, and political figures.
Another characteristic of the DSB, which may also characterize
international organizations on a broader scale,111 is the ability to
channel the behavior of member states.112 While realists may posit
that states will always act with purely self-interested motives, within
the legal framework of the DSB, such behavior may ultimately
contribute to the long-term success of the dispute settlement body.
The compulsory jurisdiction of the DSB assures members that
involvement in the dispute settlement system will involve repeat
participation, as both a complainant and respondent. This knowledge
is bolstered through the explicit DSU requirement that all recourse
concerning perceived violations of the WTO covered agreements be

that China can use the U.S. threats of retaliation as “helpful political
tools to complement its own reform effort”) (emphasis added).
108. Bown, supra note 48, at 281.
109. Bown, supra note 37, at 43; see also Ji & Huang, supra note 36, at 31
(arguing that the increase in litigation and regularity could help to
dispel the Chinese suspicion of international organization and the
imposition of international law in China).
110. Bown, supra note 37, at 31.
111. Cf. Ryan, supra note 15, at 394 (“Institutions are the humanly devised
constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction.”).
112. See McRae, supra note 24, at 6 (noting the ability of a legal system to
channel the behavior of participants through “rules that provide
guidance on how to behave or processes that make certain kinds of
conduct possible”).
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settled through the DSB mechanisms.113 The knowledge of recurring
involvement in the DSB instills within both the United States and
China an investment in the long-term success of the organization.114
This commitment means that both countries will be willing to comply
with an adverse ruling in hopes that the other will comply the next
time it faces an adverse ruling.115 The understanding that future cases
will be brought means neither nation will self-destruct the entire
system.116 The DSB provides stability for conducting bilateral
negotiations knowing that there is a formal, predictable system to
resort to if negotiations collapse or if promises are broken.
The WTO exemplifies the economic reality that all nations have
interdependent economic systems. Accordingly, the appearance of
trade frictions will not be an anomaly but rather a signature of a
growing economic order in which interactions between members are
ever-more prevalent and routine.117 The DSB’s legal functioning as the
mechanism through which to resolve these trade frictions assures
members of the reoccurrence of WTO disputes. In doing so, it
establishes a significantly high threshold for measuring the importance
of any one individual case or issue in the broader scheme of future
DSB interactions as well as the enjoyment of other expected benefits
provided under the covered agreements. The existence of this high
threshold dissuades losing parties from persistently noncomplying or
calling into question the legitimacy of the DSB itself.118 In the ruleoriented dispute settlement structure of the DSB, all participants,
whether a developed or a less developed country, have an interest in
preserving the legitimacy of the dispute settlement system in order to
accrue perceived benefits.119 As such, the behavior of member states is

113. DSU, supra note 6, art. 23.
114. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
115. See Granger, supra note 24, at 532 (“Countries believe that their future
gains will be higher if the dispute settlement system has a high rate of
compliance.”).
116. The responses from the Chinese government have demonstrated a
deliberate abstention from “making statements inside or outside the
WTO that would call into question the authority of the dispute
settlement system or discredit DSB rulings.” Kennedy, supra note 22, at
576. Instead, Beijing tends to express its discontent with more tempered
rhetoric so as not to question the overarching legitimacy of the DSB. Id.
117. See Granger, supra note 24, at 532 (“States are aware of the importance
of maintaining healthy long-term relations because they understand
their trade prospects are integrally linked to their economic welfare.”).
118. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
119. Granger, supra note 24, at 532. For a discourse on a method for
analyzing an the perceived legitimacy of an international tribunal or, in
this case, an international dispute settlement body, see Laurence Helfer
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channeled so as to preserve the longevity of the DSB. Both the
United States and China thus have a sufficient vested interest in the
DSB beyond any single dispute, with behavioral responses skewed
toward compliance as well as an instilled reticence to indict any one
DSB determination as perversely flawed or illegitimate.
As China attempts to project its brand as an international power
on a “peaceful rise,”120 it must employ tools other than its military
might to advance this image. Professor Joseph Nye articulates that
nations can exert influence and advance interest through the use of
“soft power.”121 Nye defines soft power as “us[ing] a different type of
currency (not force, not money) to engender cooperation—an
attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing
to the achievement of those values.”122 The DSB is a forum from
which the Chinese government can project both its legal acumen and
willingness to engage international organizations as a soft power.123 As
a component of the peaceful-rise strategy, China is better able to
protect its interests from within the WTO than challenging its
legitimacy.124 The People’s Republic has demonstrated that it is
making a good faith effort to adhere to the rules of the international
system and to provide more transparency for its actions. Even when
China loses an argument in the DSB, it continues to hone its
litigation skills and demonstrates an investment in the long-term
viability of the DSB.125 This is particularly important when China
& Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 284–85 (1997).
120. See Hsieh, supra note 39, at 375 (“China’s participation in the WTO
demonstrates the nation’s willingness to engage the global economic order
and is consistent with the country’s foreign policy mantra of ‘peaceful
rise.’”); see also Tong Qi, China’s First Decade Experience in the WTO
Dispute Settlement System: Practice and Prospect, 7 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 143, 169 (2012) (“China has self-managed its
international image as a ‘trustworthy and responsible great power.’”).
121. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD
POLITICS 5–6 (2004); see also DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA GOES GLOBAL:
THE PARTIAL POWER 207–68 (2013) (discussing and interpreting the
status of China’s soft-power efforts).
122. NYE, supra note 121, at 7; see also Qi, supra note 120, at 169 (“China is
becoming more and more influential abroad by advancing its ‘soft
power,’ which refers to a nation winning influence abroad by persuasion
and appeal rather than by threats or military force.”).
123. See Manjiao, supra note 22, at 48 (describing China’s growing activity
in the DSB as a “manifestation of its growing soft power”).
124. Kennedy, supra note 22, at 572.
125. See Ji & Huang, supra note 36, at 30 (detailing that through both
offensive and defensive cases in the DSB, China has “obtained
substantial experience” and has bolstered its knowledge on the rulebased system of the DSB).
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complies with an adverse ruling, demonstrating the validity of the
DSB and projecting to other trading partners that compliance is
required.126 This ensures that China can utilize the DSB in order to
advance its own interests and to get other trading partners, like the
United States, to alter policies that are unfavorable to the Chinese
economic system.127
One extension of this soft-power aspiration is the effect that
active participation in DSB litigation has on the development of
China’s legal institution, both specifically within WTO disputes as
well as the spillover effect to other Chinese legal forums. When China
entered the WTO in 2001, its domestic legal capabilities were brought
under harsher scrutiny. China was obligated to reform its legal system
as a prerequisite to WTO accessions, demonstrated through the
promulgation of myriad laws that aimed to bolster an anemic legal
system.128 At that time, China’s legal profession was woefully
underdeveloped in both experience and domestic reverence, having
nearly nonexistent exposure to international dispute settlement
systems.129 Beijing was faced with the daunting task of confronting
the WTO system’s sharp learning curve.130 In fact, some observers
have speculated that China’s legal capacity deficiencies contributed to
its hesitation during the initial period after accession.131 China
recognized that the shortcomings of its legal system were jeopardizing
its ability to effectively protect its trade interests through utilization
of the DSB.132 The prospect of DSB litigation serves as a catalyst for

126. See infra Part III.C (discussing China’s willingness to comply with an
adverse ruling in China—Intellectual Property Rights).
127. For an example of China’s successful ability to alter policies in the U.S.
poultry industry, see infra Part III.C.
128. See Li, supra note 47, at 1125–26 (“The shortage in human capital was
particularly acute because China was required to revise a large number
of existing laws and regulations in conformity with the WTO.”).
129. See Kennedy, supra note 22, at 574 (“Chinese government lawyers had
no prior experience of international dispute settlement, and the Chinese
legal profession is small in relative terms and has a very short history.”).
130. Gao, supra note 37, at 147.
131. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
132. China has commented on the deleterious impact that a laggard legal
capacity can have on a member’s ability to protect interests in the DSB.
China has previously cited the lack of human capital (in the legal
profession) and financial resources, in conjunction with capacity and
limited process exposure, as creating a circumstance that “results in de
facto imbalance in the participation in the dispute settlement
mechanism.” Kennedy, supra note 22, at 574 (quoting Dispute
Settlement Body, Responses to Questions on the Specific Input of
China, TN/DS/W/57 (May 15, 2003)).
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China to implement measures to bolster its legal institutional
capabilities.
These measures focus on cooperation between the Chinese
government and other individuals and organizations with legal
knowledge beneficial for dealing with WTO dispute settlement. For
example, in expanding the government’s ability to account for WTO
accession, the Chinese State Council established a Division of WTO
Law that retains in-house lawyers with specialized knowledge of
international law and the WTO system.133 In addition, the Chinese
government created a Permanent Mission in Geneva specifically for
providing a more effective management of its DSB disputes.134
Another feature is China’s adamancy in seeking out scholars, legal
experts, and professionals from around the world to instruct and
disseminate WTO legal expertise within the Chinese government,
legal profession, and universities across China.135 Similarly, China has
sent its legal experts abroad to study and practice international and
WTO law at foreign universities and other world trade forums.136
China has also fostered internal mechanisms for rapidly developing
the legal acumen necessary for effective usage of the DSB, particularly
through the generation of Chinese think tanks specialized in WTO
law.137 Finally, China built its legal experience within the WTO
through participation in WTO disputes as an interested third-party
133. Manjiao, supra note 22, at 30.
134. Id.
135. For a discussion about the extent to which China has sought to bring
legal experts into China to bolster its WTO legal experience and
knowledge, see id. at 33.
136. Howard Schneider, U.S. Racks up Wins over China, but Spoils Are
Uncertain, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2012, at A11. An example of one such
destination is Georgetown University’s Institute of International
Economic Law. Id.
137. A prime example of the Chinese home-grown WTO think tanks is the
Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Center, sponsored by the Shanghai
People’s Municipal Government. The Shanghai WTO Center provides
consulting services on legal and policy issues related to the WTO. Gong
Baihua, Shanghai’s WTO Affairs Consultation Center: Working
Together to Take Advantage of WTO Membership, in MANAGING THE
CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION 167, 168 (Peter Gallagher et al.
eds., 2005). The institution further provides “WTO-related training
services,” which is instrumental in disseminating broader general
knowledge about China’s commitments and expectations in the WTO.
Id. The Shanghai WTO Center’s services help Beijing manage WTO
commitments and disputes more effectively. The institution provides
notable support to both “central and regional governments in their
adaptation to the WTO regime.” Id; see also Hsieh, supra note 38, at
1013–15 (discussing the role of think tanks in bridging the “information
and communication gaps”).
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member.138 In doing so, China was able to observe the process without
being directly involved as a complainant or respondent. The extent to
which China is dedicating human capital and financial resources to
honing its WTO litigation capacity demonstrates its commitment to a
high-quality legal framework.
As DSB litigation prompts China’s continued internal legal
development, the benefits from a stronger, more adept legal
institution may transfer to other aspects of Chinese society as well as
China’s further interactions with other multilateral organizations. For
one, active engagement in the international dispute settlement system
can work toward strengthening the rule of law within China.139 As the
People’s Republic dedicates more resources to the training and
development of Chinese lawyers, the burgeoning legal profession has
the potential to bolster other areas and forums of law within China.
In acquiescing to the compulsory jurisdiction of the DSB and to WTO
commitments, Beijing demonstrates the practical application of law as
well as the ability of a rule-oriented dispute settlement mechanism to
be a “powerful and effective way to guarantee that the laws are
strictly followed by all members.”140 Additional benefitted institutions
are the other multilateral regimes with which China interacts, both
regionally and internationally. Some observers speculate that as China
becomes more experienced and confident in the functioning of the
DSB, this may create a shift in China’s perception of other
multilateral organizations.141 While the WTO is the only international
dispute settlement system from which China accepts compulsory
138. Every WTO member has the right to participate in a dispute if it has a
“substantial interest” in the dispute’s resolution. DSU, supra note 6,
art. 10.2. The member is permitted the opportunity to “be heard by the
panel and to make written submissions to the panel.” Id. During the
initial period after China’s accession, Beijing reserved the right to thirdparty status for most DSB disputes. See Ji & Huang, supra note 36, at
25 (noting that China reserved third-party status in every DSB panel
established between August 2003 and early 2007). China was able to
garner significant experience and knowledge for developing its own legal
prowess with the DSB processes through the use of third-party status.
See id. at 26 (“For the Chinese legal teams, the best way to follow and
learn is to join in the practices [through third-party status] and to
gather firsthand knowledge and experiences.”); see also Qi, supra note
120, at 158 (discussing China’s rationale for utilizing third-party status
as “primarily concerned with acquiring knowledge of the system”);
Hsieh, supra note 38, at 1034 (analyzing China’s third-party
participation as a low-cost means of providing China’s Department of
Treaty and Law lawyers and Chinese law firms with DSB expertise).
139. Manjiao, supra note 22, at 49.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., Li, supra note 47, at 1136 (discussing the possibility of the
attitudinal shift to diffuse to “other areas of regional and global
governance . . . requiring multilateral efforts”).
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jurisdiction, the positive experience within the DSB may foster a
broader acceptance of multilateralism in Beijing that transcends to
other multilateral organizations.
These indirect benefits provide both the United States and China
with hefty incentives for maintaining a strategy of using DSB
litigation to resolve trade frictions. First, the DSB serves as an outlet
through which the governments in both countries can vent domestic
frustration. Being a legal intermediary aids in bolstering the
legitimacy of reform efforts in China while also diffusing the political
frustrations surrounding such reforms. Second, the DSB helps to
stymie the desire to engage in tit-for-tat trade battles through the use
of channeled behaviors as both nations realize that future litigation
means a routinized compliance system. Third, accepting the DSB’s
compulsory jurisdiction as an international dispute settlement body
helps China project its soft-power presence within the global
community. Finally, China’s involvement within DSB litigation
fosters the development of Beijing’s legal capacity in regard to WTO
litigation, the legal profession in China, and other multilateral regimes
in which China is engaged.
C.

Compliance as an Indicator of Acceptance: U.S.—Poultry and
China—Intellectual Property Rights

The comprehensive compliance features of the DSB are one of the
most important innovations of the WTO system, providing an
enforcement mechanism within the international trading sphere.142
While this Note recognizes that the DSB’s enforcement mechanisms
are far from perfect, the DSB does provide an invaluable tool for
stabilizing the international economic system.143 This Note advances
the argument that compliance with DSB determinations through
implementation is an indicator of a state’s willingness to accept the

142. Article 21 of the DSU highlights the importance of compliance,
recognizing that “[p]rompt compliance with recommendations or rulings
of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes
to the benefit of all Members.” DSU, supra note 6, art. 21.1. The DSU
implements a number of methods for monitoring and enforcing
compliance with panel and Appellate Body determinations. For one, the
DSU institutes a surveillance system for monitoring a state’s compliance
through a framework of specific deadlines. Id. art. 21.3. If these methods
are unable to produce compliance, the DSU provides for targeted
retaliation aimed at removing the noncompliant measures. See supra
notes 74–75, 78 and accompanying text.
143. But see MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 230 (“[W]hile the DSU is generally
good at generating adopted reports, securing their implementation,
particularly in sensitive or controversial cases, may be subject to
considerable delay. One reason . . . is that the system described above
provides cost-free opportunities for foot-dragging by the losing party.”).
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legitimacy of the DSB.144 A state’s compliance illustrates its
recognition of the underlying principles of the DSB, and the
implementation reaffirms the state’s dedication to the long-term
sustainability of the dispute settlement system.145 Thus, a state’s
compliance record on adverse rulings serves as an effective mechanism
for evaluating a state’s commitment to resolving trade frictions
through the DSB.146
In terms of compliance records for disputes between the United
States and the People’s Republic, the record of cases reaching either
panel or appellate determinations is relatively limited. As of
April 2013, five of the eight disputes China initiated as complainant
had reached some determinative level.147 The limited scope is more
apparent in the number of disputes reaching panel or appellate
determination when the United States initiates as a complainant—
seven out of fifteen cases.148 Since China’s accession to the WTO in
2001, the Chinese government has often preferred to negotiate a
settlement to the WTO dispute prior to the submission of the DSB
determination.149 A complete summary of all cases between Beijing
and Washington would be unnecessary for the purposes of this Note.
Instead, an analysis of two representative disputes in which both
countries faced adverse rulings provides a beneficial insight into the
United States’ and China’s approaches to DSB compliance.
In U.S.—Poultry, China requested a panel determination to
challenge the United States’ measure concerning China’s access to the
U.S. market for poultry.150 The measure at issue was section 727 of
the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009,151 which prohibited the use
of funds from the act to “establish or implement a rule allowing
144. Because this Note focuses on litigation between the United States and
China within the Dispute Settlement Body, analysis of China’s
compliance with commitments not brought before the DSB are beyond
its scope (specifically, compliance with China’s Accession Protocol
requirements).
145. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 22, at 580 (calling compliance and
implementation the “ultimate test” for a state’s acceptance of the
WTO’s rule-oriented system).
146. Id.
147. Chronological List of Disputes Cases, supra note 55.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., China—Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, WT/DS309
(Oct. 5, 2005) (mutually agreed solution); China—Measures Affecting
Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information
Suppliers, WT/DS373 (Dec. 4, 2008) (agreement through Memorandum
of Understanding).
150. U.S.—Poultry, supra note 4, ¶ 2.1.
151. Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524 (2009).
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poultry products to be imported” into the United States from
China.152 The provision constructively prevented Chinese poultry from
being reimported into the United States after the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) had determined that China was once again
eligible to export poultry product to the United States.153 This USDA
determination removed the total ban on Chinese poultry that was
imposed in response to the avian flu epidemic in 2004.154
China put forward a number of claims under various WTOcovered agreements, including Articles I and XI of the 1994 GATT
Agreement on Agriculture and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)
Agreement.155 The Panel in U.S.—Poultry held, with regard to the
most important issues, that section 727 was inconsistent with U.S.
obligations under GATT156 and the SPS Agreement.157 Furthermore,
the Panel rejected the United States’ assertion of Article XX(b) of the
GATT 1994 that claimed the measure was enacted in order to
“protect human and animal life and health from the risk posed by the
importation of poultry products from China.”158 Despite the dispute
involving an important national issue—health and safety—the United
States did not appeal the determination. In fact, as the Panel noted,
the measure in contest expired two days after China submitted its
first written submission.159 Although the measure expired prior to the
Panel report, the dispute still provides a valuable insight into the
United States’ approach to compliance with adverse DSB rulings
involving China. The Panel addressed the fundamental issue of
whether it was able to rule on an expired measure, illustrating the
impact on compliance concerns. The Panel noted that the inconsistent
measure was a component of an annual U.S. appropriations
legislation; in fact, the inconsistent language was a reiteration of a
previous appropriations provision.160 Since the United States never
conceded that the measure was inconsistent with its WTO
obligations, without a DSB determination, the United States could
have “easily re-imposed” the offending measure.161 While this dispute
152. Id. ¶ 2.2.
153. Ji & Huang, supra note 36, at 8.
154. Id.
155. U.S.—Poultry, supra note 4, ¶ 7.59.
156. E.g., id. ¶ 7.441 (finding the measure inconsistent with Article I:1 of the
GATT 1994).
157. E.g., id. ¶¶ 7.204, 7.294 (finding the measure inconsistent with Articles
5.1, 5.2, and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement).
158. Id. ¶¶ 7.458, 7.483.
159. Id. ¶ 7.51.
160. Id. ¶ 7.55.
161. Id.
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did not require the United States to take any proactive step in
removing the offending measure, the DSB determination established
the inconsistency of such a provision in future legislation. The United
States demonstrated its willingness to comply with the Panel’s
determination through the continued omission of a similar provision
in subsequent annual appropriations legislation.
Similarly, China was faced with an adverse panel ruling in 2008
over intellectual property rights protections.162 The Panel analyzed
three claims the United States brought against China under the
TRIPS Agreement.163 The United States challenged several Chinese
measures, or lack thereof, including: (1) a lack of adequate thresholds
for “criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in cases of wilful
[sic] trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial
scale”;164 (2) “China's measures for disposing of confiscated goods that
infringe intellectual property rights”;165 and (3) “denying the
protection of its Copyright Law to creative works of authorship” for
works not authorized for publication or distribution within China.166
The Panel in China—Intellectual Property Rights presented a
detailed assessment of each claim’s individual legality. With regard to
the first issue on criminal thresholds, the Panel determined that the
United States had not established any inconsistency in China’s
measure.167 The Panel found in favor of the United States on the other
two issues concerning customs measures168 and the Copyright Law.169
The Panel recommended “pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU that
China bring the Copyright Law and the customs measures into
conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.”170
In response to the Panel’s determination, China informed the
DSB that it would comply with the Panel’s recommendations.171 Here,
as with the United States in U.S.—Poultry, China did not appeal the
Panel’s ruling. China implemented internal changes to both measures
162. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
163. China—Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 5, ¶¶ 2.2-2.4; see supra
note 94 and accompanying text.
164. China—Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 5, ¶ 2.2.
165. Id. ¶ 2.3.
166. Id. ¶ 2.4.
167. Id. ¶ 7.669.
168. Id. ¶ 7.395(c).
169. Id. ¶ 7.191.
170. Id. ¶ 8.4.
171. Communication from China, China—Measures Affecting the Protection
and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/11 (Apr.
15, 2009).
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found inconsistent with China’s TRIPS Agreement obligations. China
notified the DSB that the Standing Committee of the Eleventh
National People’s Congress had adopted an amendment to the
Copyright Law to bring the measure into conformity.172 In addition,
the State Council of the People’s Republic amended the customs
measures in order to comply with the remainder of the Panel’s
recommendations.173 Subsequently, on April 20, 2010, China notified
the DSB that it was compliant with regard to all measures found
inconsistent in China—Intellectual Property Rights.174 This case
indicates China’s willingness to comply with the adverse rulings and
bring its inconsistent measures into conformity with its WTO
obligations.
While the cases discussed demonstrate a good record on DSB
compliance from the United States and China, U.S.—Poultry and
China—Intellectual Property Rights represent a small body of
available DSB-compliance cases between the two nations. Many allege
that the United States is a notoriously noncompliant state within the
WTO because the United States has repeatedly been accused of
delaying compliance.175 However, when faced with adverse rulings in
disputes with China, the United States has maintained a better
compliance record, although not always through routine means of
implementation.176 For China, many scholars laud its compliance
record within the DSB as one demonstrating a “responsible attitude
toward its international obligations.”177 In terms of additional

172. Status Report Regarding Implementation of the DSB Recommendations
and Rulings in the Dispute by China, China—Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
WT/DS362/14/Add.2 (Mar. 9, 2010).
173. Kennedy, supra note 22, at 581.
174. Ji & Huang, supra note 36, at 19 (citing Dispute Settlement Body,
Minutes of Meeting, ¶ 82, WT/DSB/M/282 (Apr. 20, 2010)).
175. See id. at 4 n.9 (citing a representative example of U.S. delayed
compliance).
176. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive AntiDumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China,
WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011) (implementing the determination on
August 13, 2012, with no compliance proceeding initiated); see also Ji &
Huang, supra note 36, at 4 (discussing the United States’ removal of the
disputed measures in U.S.—Steel Safeguards only days before the
adoption of the DSB report).
177. Qi, supra note 120, at 169; see also, e.g., Manjiao, supra note 22, at 37
(discussing China’s “positive attitude toward WTO dispute
settlement”); Kennedy, supra note 22, at 588 (praising China for not
“challeng[ing] the authority of the WTO dispute settlement system or
attempt[ing] to frustrate the procedures”); Malawer, supra note 89, at
32 (acknowledging that China has been “playing by the rules of the
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compliance instances, both nations have notified the DSB of the
implementation of two adverse panel determinations in 2013; one
against China (China—Electronic Payment Services)178 and one
against the United States (U.S.—Shrimp and Sawblades).179 In both
cases, the losing party informed the DSB that it intends to comply
with the determination, implementing the recommendations within
the negotiated reasonable period of time deadline under Article
21.3(b) of the DSU.180 If the trend toward increased usage of the DSB
to resolve U.S.-Sino trade frictions continues, the record of disputes
reaching either panel or appellate determinations should increase in
frequency.181 Ultimately, this will provide a greater sample size for
determining the degree to which the United States and China are
willing to implement adverse rulings. If either nation consistently fails
to implement determinations in the future, the viability of the DSB to
resolve trade frictions may be jeopardized because noncompliance may
instigate reciprocal noncompliance from the other nation.
D.

Less Appealing Alternatives to the Dispute Settlement System

One of many factors inducing China and the United States to
engage one another in the DSB is that alternative mechanisms for
alleviating trade frictions are not as alluring. First, bilateral
negotiations present a number of obstacles that can prove ineffectual
international trading system [which] indicat[es] a growing support of
that system”).
178. Panel Report, China—Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment
Services, WT/DS413/R (July 16, 2012).
179. Panel Report, U.S.—Anti-Dumping Measures on Shrimp and Diamond
Sawblades from China, WT/DS422/R (June 8, 2012).
180. On July 11, 2013, China notified the DSB of its implementation of the
Panel’s determination in China—Electronic Payment Services. Status
Report Regarding Implementation of the DSB Recommendations and
Rulings in the Dispute by China, China—Certain Measures Affecting
Electronic Payment Services, WT/DS413/9/Add.1 (July 12, 2013).
Likewise, the United States notified the DSB on March 14, 2013 of its
implementation of the adverse ruling in U.S.—Shrimp and Sawblades.
Status Report Regarding Implementation of the DSB Recommendations
and Rulings in the Dispute by the United States, United States—AntiDumping Measures on Certain Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades from
China, WT/DS422/8/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2013).
181. Two disputes initiated by China are currently in the panel stage of the
DSB process. Chronological List of Disputes Cases, supra note 55. On
the other hand, the United States has five disputes against China in the
consultation and panel stages of the DSB. Id. If these disputes
ultimately result in a DSB determination, the resulting implementation
efforts will illuminate whether the United States and China, when faced
with more potential adverse rulings, will continue to maintain a good
compliance record.
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at resolving complex and politically sensitive trade disputes.182 Trade
relations between two powers are often extremely complex, especially
considering the diverse expectations and interests between the United
States and China. Bilateral relations have the potential to succumb to
volatile national interests because multiple, complex issues are woven
into inseparable political interests creating an impasse in
negotiations.183 Furthermore, when bilateral negotiations deteriorate,
it can lead to unconstrained unilateral retaliation. Unilateral actions
have the potential to spark tit-for-tat retaliation between the
countries, leading to a worsened trade environment.184
Secondly, the prospects of multilateral negotiations resolving
trade disputes or remedying flaws in the current system remain far
from certain. While the Doha Round185 of negotiations concerning
further WTO development continues, little progress has been made in
reaching consensus on major issues.186 The Doha Round of discussions
has effectively stalled, and expectations of meaningful reform do not
appear reasonable in the near future. In fact, the inability of members
to utilize the WTO’s rule-making function to enact fundamental
changes through the Doha Round further augments the role of the
DSB in resolving current trade frictions.187 The self-interest of
invested parties can cause important issues to become intractable,
reducing the efficacy of both bilateral and multilateral negotiations.
This Note recognizes that the other forms for resolving trade
frictions remain useful mechanisms, which DSB litigation will not
outright supplant. Instead, the role of WTO litigation as a tool with
182. See Malawer, supra note 89, at 32 (discussing how bilateral trade
discussions “repeatedly fail to reach accommodations”).
183. See MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 236 (“[T]rade disputes are complex,
often involve changing economic and political interests and are capable
of arousing strong national passions.”).
184. See Bown, supra note 37, at 42–43 (examining the retaliatory events
that can follow U.S. Congressional unilateral action against China and
the deleterious effects of those actions). In addition to the damage to
economic factors, unilateral action also imposes a burden to demonstrate
the legal basis for the restriction within the international community.
Id. at 42.
185. Launched in 2001, the Doha Round “is the latest round of trade
negotiations among the WTO membership. Its aim is to achieve major
reform of the international trading system through the introduction of
lower trade barriers and revised trade rules.” The Doha Round, World
Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/d
da_e.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2013).
186. See, e.g., Malawer, supra note 89, at 32 (noting that the “multilateral
negotiation process of rule-making” has become “bogged down” in the
Doha Round of negotiations).
187. Kennedy, supra note 22, at 572.
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which to mollify trade frictions is expanding within the framework of
U.S.-Sino relations.188 The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is
particularly important when bilateral negotiations break down,
requiring another intermediary to mitigate the trade frictions.189 As
trade frictions between the United States and China proliferate, the
unique position of the DSB as a compulsory international dispute
settlement body provides both countries with a viable—and perhaps
preferred—method of handling trade issues.

IV. Limitations to the Theory
As with any mechanism for resolving disputes between diverse
parties, the efficacy and viability of the DSB is subject to limitations.
One limitation is the particular political conditions that can prove to
be extremely volatile.190 Another limitation is that the system can
only be effective insofar as both the People’s Republic and the United
States continue to subjectively believe the DSB is legitimate, fair, and
impartial.191 The involved parties must have confidence in the dispute
settlement process for the benefits discussed in Parts III.A and III.B
to accrue and for the DSB to have long-term success.192 If either
188. While the statements of the U.S. Trade Representative on China’s
WTO Compliance demonstrate a commitment to traditional bilateral
and multilateral methods, they also express the United States’
willingness to use the DSB without hesitation. Compare U.S. TRADE
REP., 2012 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 12
(2012) (“The [U.S.] Administration will use all available tools to achieve
these objectives, including the pursuit of productive, outcome-oriented
dialogue in both bilateral and multilateral settings . . . .”), with id. (“At
the same time, as the United States has repeatedly demonstrated, when
dialogue is not successful in resolving WTO-related concerns, the United
States will not hesitate to invoke the dispute settlement mechanism at
the WTO where appropriate.”).
189. See id. at 23 (noting that when bilateral negotiations failed to remedy
the United States’ concerns, the United States utilized the DSB to hold
China accountable for adherence to WTO rules); see also Hearing
Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, supra note 99, at 45 (“A
common WTO ‘rule book’ and an impartial body in Geneva have helped
the two sides resolve differences when dialogue fails.”).
190. See supra note 183; see also, e.g., Ji & Huang, supra note 36, at 37
(discussing the potentially harmful effect of politically sensitive issues on
China’s “prompt and proper” compliance); Kennedy, supra note 22, at
574 (“The sensitivity in China regarding some of the issues . . . is
illustrated by the fact that access to the International Economic Law
and Policy blog, well-known in WTO circles around the world, was
blocked in China for a time.”).
191. See Bown, supra note 37, at 43 (discussing the possibility that, if the
system is perceived as unfair, there could be “calls” for China to
withdraw from the DSB).
192. See supra notes 112–19 and accompanying text.
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country begins to feel as though it is the target of arbitrary or
capricious DSB determinations, the country’s willingness to utilize the
dispute settlement mechanism may drastically wane.193 Furthermore,
persistent noncompliance with DSB determinations, from either
Washington or Beijing, may undermine the DSB’s legitimacy and
cause a reciprocal pattern of noncompliance.194 Persistent
noncompliance would have a rippling effect throughout the WTO as
an effective enforcement mechanism is necessary to protect and ensure
the commitments and expectations of member states.
The extreme of these limitations is that either China or the
United States could lose complete faith in the DSB. This result would
diminish the DSB’s long-term effectiveness as countries refuse to
resort to WTO litigation. Such diminishment would be evidenced by:
(1) plummeting compliance rates, (2) more unilateral trade
retaliations, and (3) increased potential for a full-blown trade war.
While the extreme scenario is highly improbable, both countries
should be wary of the potential for a slippery slope of system abuse.
Although the increased litigation between the United States and
China in the DSB has effectively managed trade frictions between the
parties, bestowing both direct and indirect benefits, the operation of
the DSB as an international dispute settlement mechanism is subject
to potential erosions in legitimacy.195

Conclusion
Ever-expanding global trade relations have spawned highly
contentious disputes between the United States and China, two of the
world’s most powerful economic juggernauts. The volatility of these
193. Bown, supra note 37, at 43; see also MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 236
(“[A]n insistence on established rules can only be effective if the rules in
question are not only interpreted competently, but also regarded as
appropriate, and as such command general acceptance.”).
194. See Kennedy, supra note 22, at 587 (warning of the danger that China
may view “past and present cases of non-compliance” as the status quo
and change its implementation approach to mimic the perceived
normative practice).
195. Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter analyzed the importance of
legitimacy in supranational adjudication as the ability to “command
acceptance and support from the community.” Laurence Helfer & AnneMarie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 284 (1997) (quoting ARCHIBALD COX,
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 103
(1976)). The erosion of the DSB’s legitimacy can occur through a
number of events dealing with members’ perception of the institution
(for example, loss of impartiality; flawed decision making, either in
principle or reasoning; and lack of consistency in DSB determinations).
Cf. id. at 284 (describing some of the “formulations of the sources of
judicial legitimacy”).

236

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 1·2013
Providing a Release Valve

disputes has caused numerous observers to opine that trade frictions
could devolve into an outright trade war. The United States and
China have demonstrated a willingness to utilize the DSB and its
rule-oriented structure to mitigate the harmful effects of possible
trade warfare. While the design of the DSB is not perfect, its
institutional structure provides a number of direct benefits that
induce member participation. This Note examined how these direct
benefits ensure a stable economic environment through a highly
regulated remedy structure, an appellate system to serve as a legal
safeguard, and an independent quasi-judicial body to diminish
political unpredictability on issue determination. Aside from these
institutional benefits, the indirect benefits that both Washington and
Beijing accrue help explain the surge in desire to resort to DSB
litigation. For one, both the U.S. and Chinese governments can garner
political protection from utilizing the DSB as an intermediary through
which to release domestic frustrations. Additionally, the DSB also
assists in channeling member behavior toward a long-term investment
in the international economic system, projecting soft power, and
building the Chinese legal capacity. The attractiveness of DSB
litigation continues to grow as other mechanisms for resolving trade
frictions fail to provide suitable resolution, including both bilateral
and multilateral negotiations. This Note examined the dedication of
both the United States and the People’s Republic to the long-term
viability of the system through an analysis of compliance with DSB
determinations. In both U.S.—Poultry and China—Intellectual
Property Rights, the countries accepted the recommendations of the
DSB and brought the offending measures into conformity with WTO
obligations
Ultimately, both the United States and China must devote great
care and attention to the management of DSB litigation. The United
States must be wary of vilifying China when trade frictions arise; such
a perception can foster anti-Chinese sentiment which can lead to
protectionist measures. The growth in protectionist measures
predicated on domestic ire will frustrate the effective operation of the
DSB and diminish the direct and indirect benefits that the
organization provides. The United States should recognize the
significance of China’s willingness to resolve trade frictions through a
compulsory, third-party intermediary. Although litigation is
adversarial in nature, the United States would benefit from a stronger
Chinese confidence in international dispute settlement systems.
While the DSB is providing a means of resolving tense trade
issues, the efficacy and legitimacy of the system is predicated on the
United States’ and China’s perceptions of the DSB’s fairness,
impartiality, and legal quality. Although some commentators
interpret the increased DSB litigation as foreshadowing an impending
trade war, the discourse must be transformed into a broader scrutiny
of the role of the DSB and the approach that the United States and
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China have taken toward trade disputes. With responsible
management of DSB litigation, the countries are able to benefit from
the existence of a highly functioning international legal forum. As
illustrated by DSB interactions since China’s accession to the WTO,
the United States and the People’s Republic have much to gain from
the usage of the DSB to resolve contentious trade frictions and would
do well to maintain such an advantageous system.
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